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Statements

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Rastreo de proximidad descentralizado para preservar la privacidad Sécurité et respect de la vie privée des applications Covid-19
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La sécurité et le respect de la vie privée des applications Covid-19 sont nécessaire pour que les utilisateurs aient confiance et les adoptent largement. Les applications de traçage des contacts au Covid-19 permettent d'identifier des personnes susceptibles d'avoir contracté le Covid-19 et d'obtenir des informations supplémentaires utiles à la compréhension de la propagation du virus. Les applications récupèrent ainsi des informations confidentielles sur ses utilisateurs, et divers protocoles sont alors mis en place pour anonymiser les individus et protéger la vie privée de ses usagés. Parmi ces protocoles, la collecte des données collectées différera avec GPS ou Bluetooth, et le traitement des données se réalisera soit sur le serveur (protocole dit centralisé), soit sur le téléphone (prot
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2021.0 Juillet 2020 2019 2017 2020
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Carli, A. and Franco, Muriel and Gassmann, A. and Killer, Christian and Rodrigues, Bruno and John Scheid, Eder and Schoenbaechler, D. and Stiller, Burkhard Baptiste Robert Ahmed, Nadeem and Michelin, Regio and Xue, Wanli and Ruj, Sushmita and Malaney, Robert and Kanhere, Salil and Seneviratne, Aruna and Hu, Wen and Janicke, Helge and Jha, Sanjay S. Sharma and G. Singh and R. Sharma and P. Jones and S. Kraus and Y. K. Dwivedi Hassan, Shaikh and Bibon, Soumik and Hossain, Md Shohrab and Atiquzzaman, Mohammed Nguyen, Thien Duc and Miettinen, Markus and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza Castelluccia, Claude and Bielova, Nataliia and Boutet, Antoine and Cunche, Mathieu and Lauradoux, Cédric and Métayer, Daniel and Roca, Vincent Gupta, Rajan and Bedi, Manan and Goyal, Prashi and Wadhera, Srishti and Verma, Vaishnavi Wasilij Beskorovajnov and Felix Dörre and Gunnar Hartung and Alexander Koch and Jörn Müller-Quade and Thorsten Strufe "Seldağ Güneş Peschke and Ömer Fatih Sayan" Li Jinfeng and Guo Xinyi Pietro Tedeschi and S. Bakiras and R. D. Pietro Bradford, Laura and Aboy, Mateo and Liddell, Kathleen Fraunhofer AISEC Tania Martin, Georgios Karopoulos, José L. Hernández-Ramos, Georgios Kambourakis, Igor Nai Fovino AFP Emre Kursat Kaya
prop-fr:date
2020-05-18 --03-01 2020-11-05 2020-05-26 2020-04-27 2020-10-25 2020 2004 2021-01-04 2020-11-23 2020-03-19 5 2020-07-20 2020-04-20 19 September 16, 2020 2020-04-21 2020-05-25 2020-09-09 2020-05-05 2020-04-14 2020-09-04 Jul 4, 2020 2021-01-08 March 30 2020 Avril 2020 2020-05-27 2020-05-06 2020-04-22 April 19 2020 2020-05-29
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10.1177 10.1145 -9.0 10.1126 10.1109 10.1093 10.1155 10.2139 10.2196 10.1016
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Azad2020 TraceSecure aarogya_hacked tousanticovid azad gos_impact spreadmenot aarogya_analysis comparative_study_privacy_policies mix_zones sharma dp3t_anlaysis chine_hangzhou china_app hashomer singapore_tracing_app_mandatory police_acces_data_singapour thailande_app knob stopcovid_issue_implementation aclu_wp qatar_obligatoire aarogya_app bluetooth_threats travel_advice_turkey sonia chine_app fraunhofer rakningc-19 survey_covidtrackingapp afp_apps_success thailand_app BlueTrace def_vie_privee Buccafurri cloture_mise_en_demeure_cnil contra_corona qatar_amnesty desire jinfeng aarogya_answer emre contact_tracing_privacy_considerations gdpr_stress_test wetrace chine_prolongation_app dp3t mise_en_demeure_cnil ble_auth pub_perceptions app_rogue_maintaining_personal_privacy police_access_data_israel ROBERT jp_blueprint quant_sars-cov-2_trans argument_contre_stopcovid stopcovid_issue_tx join_statement tracage_anonyme_dangereux_oxymore
prop-fr:isbn
9788366675162 9781450380850 978
prop-fr:issn
2053 2691 2327
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ArXiv Cryptology ePrint Archive Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing IEEE Access, IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management Computers & Security Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2020/489 2020 arXiv e-prints Journal of Law and the Biosciences
prop-fr:lang
en fr
prop-fr:langue
en fr
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Virtual Event, USA "Berlin"
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aout Sep Juin
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Tippenhauer Peyrega De Angelis Nakamoto Yu Azad Nguyen Thi Sheng Hau L. P. Nguyen Baker Breiner Johnson Crowcrof Pinkas Kahn Le Métayer Stisa Granick Mueller-Hsia Bell Bonnetain Troncoso Cho Mayers B. Rasmussen Labrini Ferretti Hicks Kostka Castelluccia al. Lis Bay Zhong Cunche du net Mohan Krolik Antonioli Butler Ippolito Habich-Sobiegalla Liang Hecht-Felella Yongquan Arshad Kek Tan Payer Hubaux Lin Mozur Stanley Boutet Roca Buccafurri Anh Quy Blazy Bielova Lauradoux Al Stajano Vaudenay Khanh Dang Braudo Ajmal Azad Tri Dang Akmal LEESA-NGUANSUK Beresford Raskar
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3 1 4
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1
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235 196.0 29 1 1047 2056305120947657 {127-131},
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Fan Yun William S.M.A T. Daniele Carl Jennifer Ramesh Thao Serge I. Kasper Mathieu C. F. Liza Jonathan Paul Aaron Cecilia La quadrature Junaid Nils Ole Sabrina Luca Suchit J. Josh L. Olivier A. Ai Thao Syed Muhammad Ali Matthew Genia M. N. Daphne Bobbie D. Samuel Francesco Laura Tran Muhammad Kaylana Jay A. R. B. Kate V. Hyunghoon Vincenzo & Xavier
prop-fr:périodique
Social Media + Society Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 12466 HAL archives-ouvertes.fr 28 aclu IEEE Annual Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops, 2004. Proceedings of the Second SAGE meetings Association for Computing Machinery none SSRN JMIR mHealth and uHealth Proceedings of the 7th ACM Workshop on Moving Target Defense arxiv Cyber Governance and Digital Democracy CORONALOGY: Multidisciplinary Academic Analysis in Perspective of Covid-19 IEEE Internet of Things Journal arxiv.org
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A Survey of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps, AppsGoneRogue : Maintaining Personal Privacy in an Epidemic ACLU White Paper: The Limits of Location Tracking in an Epidemic COVID-19 contact tracing apps: a stress test for privacy, the GDPR, and data protection regimes The KNOB is Broken: Exploiting Low Entropy in the Encryption Key Negotiation Of Bluetooth BR/EDR Rating the Privacy Protections of State Covid-19 Tracking Apps Droit au respect de la vie privée Varying degrees of success for coronavirus apps in Europe Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing DESIRE: A Third Way for a European Exposure Notification System Leveraging the best of centralized and decentralized systems En Chine, une ville veut pérenniser l’application de traçage après le Covid-19 Additionnal TX_POWER_LEVEL_OFFSET to BLE payload out of ROBERT protocol Aarogya Setu: The story of a failure Statement from Team #AarogyaSetu on data security of the App. Singapore Police Force can obtain TraceTogether data for criminal investigations: Desmond Tan Mix zones: user privacy in location-aware services TraceSecure : Towards Privacy PreservingContact Tracing Some prominent exposure apps are slowly rolling back freedoms COVID-19 and Health Code: How Digital Platforms Tackle the Pandemic in China Analysis of DP3T Ranking C-19 All citizens and residents are obligated to install the EHTERAZ app on smartphones when leaving the house for any reason. Contact Tracing Mobile Apps for COVID-19: Privacy Considerations and Related Trade-offs SpreadMeNot: A Provably Secure and Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing Protocol In Coronavirus Fight, China Gives Citizens a Color Code, With Red Flags Qatar: Contact tracing app security flaw exposed sensitive personal details of more than one million China’s Plan to Make Permanent Health Tracking on Smartphones Stirs Concern Application TousAntiCovid Joint Statement on Contact Tracing A First Look at Privacy Analysis of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Mobile Applications Nos arguments pour rejeter StopCovid Security threats in Bluetooth technology SAFETY AND PRIVACY IN THE TIME OF COVID-19: CONTACT TRACING APPLICATIONS Le tracage anonyme, dangereux oxymore : Analyse de risques à destination des non spécialistes Analysis of COVID-19 Tracking Tool in India: Case Study of Aarogya Setu Mobile Application BlueTrace : A privacy-preserving protocol forcommunity-driven contact tracing across borders "CHAPTER 9. A Comparative Study of Privacy Policies and Data Protection During the COVID-19 Pandemic Within Different Countries" WeTrace -- A Privacy-preserving Mobile COVID-19 Tracing Approach and Application Israel Seeks to Give Police Unrestricted Access to COVID Contact Tracing Data ConTra Corona: Contact Tracing against the Coronavirus by Bridging the Centralized–Decentralized Divide for Stronger Privacy Aarogya Setu Privacy Policy Grand cafouillage à propos des applications mobiles de recherche de contact COVID-19 Contact-tracing Apps: a Survey on the Global Deployment and Challenges Impact of false-positives and false-negatives in the UK’s COVID-19 RT-PCR testing programme Digital Health Innovation: Exploring Adoption of COVID-19 Digital Contact Tracing Apps A COVID-19 Contact Tracing Self-Confirmation System for the General Population in Japan: Design and Implementation Evaluation A Privacy-Preserving Solution for Proximity Tracing Avoiding Identifier Exchanging ROBERT : ROBust and privacy-presERving proximityTracing New virus app a powerful tool A Three-Way Energy Efficient Authentication Protocol Using Bluetooth Low Energy Application StopCovid : clôture de la mise en demeure à l’encontre du ministère des Solidarités et de la Santé In Times of Crisis: Public Perceptions Towards COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps in China, Germany and the US Pandemic Contact Tracing Apps: DP-3T, PEPP-PT NTK, and ROBERT from a Privacy Perspective At risk status directly correlated to identity. Hashomer - A Proposal for a Privacy-Preserving Bluetooth Based Contact Tracing Scheme for Hamagen Application « StopCovid » : la CNIL tire les conséquences de ses contrôles Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests epidemic control with digital contact tracing Long Live Randomization: On Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing in Pandemic "Demystifying COVID-19 Digital Contact Tracing: A Survey on Frameworks and Mobile Apps" Travel Advice Turkey
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PP, 74 1 6 7 Report 2020/505 abs/2011.07306 vol. 2020
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"Sciendo" Association for Computing Machinery Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies
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section "Des libertés inutilement sacrifiées" section "Other Models"
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may 4 5 3 aout,
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wikipedia-fr:Sécurité_et_respect_de_la_vie_privée_des_applications_Covid-19
dbo:abstract
La sécurité et le respect de la vie privée des applications Covid-19 sont nécessaire pour que les utilisateurs aient confiance et les adoptent largement. Les applications de traçage des contacts au Covid-19 permettent d'identifier des personnes susceptibles d'avoir contracté le Covid-19 et d'obtenir des informations supplémentaires utiles à la compréhension de la propagation du virus. Les applications récupèrent ainsi des informations confidentielles sur ses utilisateurs, et divers protocoles sont alors mis en place pour anonymiser les individus et protéger la vie privée de ses usagés. Parmi ces protocoles, la collecte des données collectées différera avec GPS ou Bluetooth, et le traitement des données se réalisera soit sur le serveur (protocole dit centralisé), soit sur le téléphone (protocole dit décentralisé). Des attaques existent et auront divers buts comme la dés-anonymisation des utilisateurs, le traçage des individus ou la création de faux-positifs. Chaque protocole possède ainsi une meilleure défense selon un corpus d'attaques particulières et répondra à des enjeux différents. Les gouvernements de plusieurs pays ont alors adopté divers choix au sujet du protocole et de la législation qui l'entoure, entre autres en rendant l'application obligatoire ou non.